The answers of Alstom at the June 2015 AGM were happlily more respectful of the shareholders rights than at the previous December 2014 EGM.

Alstom’s Board responded publicly and in writing to the formal  “written questions” from the Phitrust Active Investor Open Fund and to the free questions Proxinvest remitted to the Company and to the AMF as earlier posted on this site.

Our final observations concerning these points:

1. The company did not reproduce ou extracts from the “Plea agreement” which did not really allow shareholders to understand the original question of Proxinvest on the nature of the offenses.

We had mentioned : “A subsidiary of Alstom, Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom AG) agreed to plead guilty to violation of US anti-bribery rules and Alstom SA pleaded guilty to failure to comply with the FCPA provisions on bookkeeping accounting and internal control (« The Defendant did knowingly falsify its books, records, or accounts such that its books, records, or accounts did not fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the Defendant »).

The “Plea agreement” (Case 3: 14-cr-00246-JBA Document Filed 12/22/14 Page 5 2 and 3) says that [1] « The Defendant did knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions were executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions were recorded as necessary (l) to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (ll) to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets was permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets was compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action was taken with respect to any differences.”  ” The Defendant is pleading guilty because it is guilty of the charges contained in the Information.”, ” The Defendant admits, agrees, and stipulates that the factual allegations set forth in the Information are true and correct, that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents described in the Information…”The Defendant failed to voluntarily disclose the conduct even though it was aware of related misconduct at Alstom Power, Inc…”

Clearly, the US DoJ was concerned about other things than  the only use of intermediary agents…

2. It is clear that the  response to the  Phitrust question number  2 is rather irrelevant. While Phitrust asked if the fine was related to events that occurred under the chairmanship of P. Kron, the answer should have been “YES, among others….” Instead, however, they pass on to another subject but we can conclude  that the fines also covers acts of corruption produced under the chairmanship of Patrick Kron: “All the information concerning the agreement with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) is in the public domain, including the fact that they treat mostly of old projects and find, at the time, weaknesses in the internal control systems of the group.

Finally, to stress at the meeting that Patrick Kron, who just dealt with the US Justice at the expense of shareholders, remains today accountable for its actions before teh US DoJ  it, falls for us  into misleading information as it is clearly partly inaccurate.

3. On the absence of the exceptional item in the las CEO Remuneration summary tables for 2014-2015 , the Alstom Board maintains the deliberate confusion that allows to scamper pay and to minimize the amount :“The amount of this compensation could be worn in both the AFEP-MEDEF summary tables included on page 224 of the Reference Document to which reference is made by the shareholder, to the extent that, contrary to what is stated in the preamble of the question, the remuneration is not due for the year ended March 31, 2015. This remuneration is indeed a compensation payment of which is subject to the completion of the transaction with General Electric and the presence of the chief executive to lead the company until the closing , the amount will be determined based on the share price. ”
and then “Regarding the eleventh resolution involving  the CEO remuneration, the presentation mentions the one hand, the elements of the fixed and variable remuneration linked to the 2014/15 financial year, and also the ceiling and the characteristics of outstanding contingent remuneration decided by the Council on 4 November 2014 which he recalled that it was due than anything as subsequent events of March 31, 2015. “
What difference shall we see between this exceptional remuneration and  a grant of performance shares  as decided and due for the same fiscal year ? In both cases, there is compulsory attendance and a requested  performance as its future value will depend on the final share price. Accordingly we seee no reason except dissimulation, to have this special treatment, especially as the company has provisioned this amount in the accounts for the 2014/2015  year. If the summary tables on remuneration diverge from the compnay accounts,  that is not good for the quality of the information.

4. The quite high score on the Say We Pay the eleventh resolution,  i.e. 87%, is for Proxinvest due to  the concealment of the valuation of this € 4M.  exceptional pay item in the summary tables.                                                                                                                                                    Leroy P. H.                               Loic Dessaint

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